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TXiKiBoT (obrolan | kontribusi)
m bot Nambih: bg:Знание
Xqbot (obrolan | kontribusi)
m bot Nambih: gan:知識; kosmetik perubahan
Baris ka-1:
'''Pangaweruh''' ([[basa Inggris|Ing.]] ''knowledge'') nyaeta hiji watesan nu loba harti gumantung kana konteksna, sanajan kitu leuwih raket hubunganna jeung sababaraha konsép kayaning harti, [[émbaran]], paréntah, komunikasi, réprésentasi, diajar, jeung [[stimulus méntal]].
 
== Pamuka ==
Pangaweruh béda jeung émbaran (informasi). Boh pangaweruh atawa émbaran ngandung pernyataan nu bener, tapi pangaweruh ngandung harti émbaran nu mibanda tujuan atawa guna. Para filsuf ngagambarkeunana salaku émbaran nu patali jeung inténsionalitas. Studi ngeunaan pangaweruh disebut [[épistémologi]].
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Baris ka-8:
What constitutes knowledge, certainty and [[truth]] are controversial issues. These issues are debated by [[philosopher]]s, [[social science|social scientists]], and [[history|historians]]. [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] wrote "On Certainty" - aphorisms on these concepts - exploring relationships between knowledge and certainty. A thread of his concern has become an entire field, the [[philosophy of action]].
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== Ngahasilkeun pangaweruh ==
<!--One way of deriving and verifying knowledge is from tradition or from generally recognized [[appeal to authority|authority]]. Knowledge may also be claimed for the pronouncements of secular or [[religion|religious]] authority such as the [[state]] or the [[church]].
 
Baris ka-42:
<!--When scientists or philosophers ask "Is knowledge possible?", they mean to say "Am I ever sufficiently justified in believing something in order to have knowledge?" Adherents of [[Philosophical skepticism]] often say "no". Philosopical skepticism is the position which critically examines whether the knowledge and perceptions people have is true; adherents of this position hold that one can never obtain true knowledge, since justification is never certain. This is a different position from [[Scientific skepticism]], which is the practical stance that one should not accept the veracity of claims until solid evidence is produced.
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== Tempo ogé ==
<!--[[Epistemology]] | [[Truth]] | [[Wisdom]] | [[Belief]] | [[Truth]] | [[Epistemology]] | [[Information]] | [[knowledge relativity]] | [[Semantic memory]] |
[[Analytic proposition]]&nbsp;|
Baris ka-110:
* [http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/courses/epist/notes/gettier.html Theory of Knowledge: The Gettier problem]
 
== Rujukan ==
* Creath, Richard, "Induction and the Gettier Problem", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.LII, No.2, June 1992.
* Feldman, Richard, "An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52 (1974): 68-69.
Baris ka-119:
* Levi, Don S., "The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins", Philosophy, 70, 1995.
* Swain, Marshall, "Epistemic Defeasibility", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.II, No.I, January 1974.
 
[[Category:Filosofi]] [[Category:Étnik]] [[Category:Pangaweruh]] [[Category:Épistemologi]]
[[Kategori:Filosofi]]
[[Kategori:Étnik]]
[[Kategori:Pangaweruh]]
[[Kategori:Épistemologi]]
 
[[ar:معرفة]]
Baris 140 ⟶ 144:
[[fi:Tieto]]
[[fr:Connaissance]]
[[gan:知識]]
[[gl:Coñecemento]]
[[he:ידע]]